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Abstract— In many industrial sectors such as factory 
automation and process control sensor redundancy is required to 
ensure reliable and highly-available operation. Measured values 
from N-redundant sensors are typically subjected to some voting 
scheme to determine a value which is used in further processing. 
In this paper we present a voting framework which allows the 
sensors and the voting scheme to be configured at system-
configuration time. The voting scheme is designed as a Real Time 
Ethernet profile. We describe the structure of the voting system 
and the design and verification of the framework. We argue the 
applicability of this sub-system based on a successful prototype 
implementation.  
Keywords—Dependability; Reliability; Real Time Ethernet; 
Voting; Triple Modular Redundancy  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Safety and dependability in distributed industrial systems 
is costly to implement and certify. In many industries, system 
engineers have begun to move from specifying application 
specific components to interfacing modular pre-certified 
devices with appropriate communication protocols in an effort 
to reduce component and deployment costs. These costs 
remain significant and we discern pressure from industry to 
reduce these costs further. One path is to develop techniques 
to allow the use of non-certified Commercial Off the Shelf 
components (COTS.)  
 In a body of work1 we investigate, specifically for the rail 
and process industries, the distribution of safe and high 
availability operation across an array of COTS components. 
This body of work has been split into phases, the derivation of 
process variables from un-dependable distributed COTS 
sensors and safe and highly available operation of COTS 
process controllers. This paper considers the first issue. 
“Distributed COTS sensors,” viewed as a domain, is 
composed of an application specific and a generic part, the 
types of sensors used are specific to the application whereas 
the handling is generic. We therefore felt that implementing a 
voting framework for such inputs would help modularise and 
standardise the voting process and so reduce the cost of 
implementation and deployment. The principle requirement 
was that the specific sensor handling be configurable at 
                                                           
1  We acknowledge the the sponsorship of this project by the Swiss 
Commission for Technology and Innovation (CTI), number 13974.1 PFES-ES 
with gratitude. 
system-integration time and the ultimate aim is suitability for 
use in distributed safe systems. The conception and prototype 
implementation are implemented with Real Time Ethernet 
(RTE) protocols in mind, specifically ones that support 
application profiles of one hue or another, otherwise we remain 
protocol agnostic to maximise portability. 
Our contributions include expanding the conception, if not 
the mathematical framework, of voting to include 
heterogeneous sensors, large arrays of sensors, support of 
multiple redundancy schemes and weighted voting. 
This paper describes the conception, architecture and 
prototype of this generic and portable voting framework for 
application in COTS components and is structured 
accordingly. This section ends with a discussion of related 
work. Section II describes the use case, voting model, and 
how we arrived at the idea of integrating the functionality in a 
communication profile. Section III describes the 
implementation details and the final section, Section IV, draws 
conclusions and describes further work.  
A. Related Work 
The fundamental ideas behind redundancy were originally 
proposed by von Neumann [1], and given mathematical form 
by Lyons et.al [2]. Their approach to faulty devices was 
stringent and it is notable that, in its original conception, 
voting consisted solely of error masking. Much work has gone 
into re-assessing this stringency by, for instance, considering 
intermittent faults [3] and strategies for hot and cold spares 
[4]. [5] provides a good summary.  
Voting has received much attention [f.i. 6, 7] so much so 
that it was considered necessary to formulate a taxonomy [8, 
9]. There are few papers dealing with distributed voting 
systems in the domain (real time embedded) targeted by our 
work and for our application domain (automation, process but 
also relevant for automotive). [10] considers distributed 
systems on a macro level, that is data transferred via files. [11] 
considers distributed embedded systems with proprietary 
communication protocols. [12] considers security aspects, an 
area currently a work-in-progress in all (commercially 
available) Real Time Ethernet protocols.   
There has been much work done in the area of the use of 
COTS in safety related applications. Most [such as 13] try to 
provide some sort of isolation of COTS components in case of 
failure. So far, despite the considerable body of work in this 
  
area, we are unaware of COTS-based architectures in use in 
industry today.    
Apart from an early work on the issues behind safe 
communication on Real Time Ethernet [14] and some work 
with EtherCAT [15] little has been published on the issues of 
safe and dependable communication over real time Ethernet 
networks and the application of Real Time Ethernet safety 
protocols.    
II. CONCEPTION  
A. Voting 
Component failure can be permissible and masked if the 
reliability of the system is not compromised and redundancy or 
diversity schemes are typically used to ensure this. Application 
of a redundancy scheme implies some form of voting, majority 
or otherwise. The idea of voting has now come to mean more 
than simple majority voting and now includes both output 
value calculation and output of diagnostic information. A 
common redundancy schemes is triple modular redundancy 
(TMR,) a 2 out of 3 voting (2oo3) scheme. There are 
applications where higher order voting schemes may be 
considered appropriate. Generally a 2oo3 or 3oo5 voting 
scheme is taken to imply that each device has equal voting 
rights but in higher order systems this need not be the case. In 
some critical systems where sensors are presumed to fail 
often, sensors near the measurand could be given weighting 
above those situated further away so any work must facilitate 
implementation of such a scheme. Another silent assumption 
is that voting is applied on homogeneous sensors but the use 
of diversity in sensors may hugely increase confidence in 
some application spaces.  
B. Model 
We model the voting process as consisting of four stages 
as shown in Figure 1, inspired by Parhami’s  discussion of 
voting [8].  
 
 
Figure 1: Voting Process Model 
 
[1…n] heterogeneous sensors, all measuring the same 
measurand, deliver data to the first stage of the voting process 
where the sensors behavior is examined and a measure of 
acceptability determined. A well behaved remote device 
responds to requests promptly and transmits its data according 
to temporal expectations defined by the system designer. A 
badly behaved device can display non-desirable behaviour 
such as erratic transmission of frames, refusal to 
configuration/re-configuration demands or simply babbles 
uncontrollably. This behavior may be permanent or 
intermittent. This stage must be robust to normal system 
behavior such as a remote sensor being powered up before the 
controller, with the controller, or after the controller. Issue 
handling includes the detection and tracking of such faults 
which ultimately implies escalation to some higher (possibly 
human) management instance.   
Once a device has been recognised as an acceptable data 
source the actual data can be examined and tested for 
plausibility. Plausibility testing may take several forms. It 
could be as simple as testing the data against some limits or it 
could take the part of grouping the data received into plausible 
or non-plausible categories. This test is one whose definition 
is in the remit of the system designer. Analogous to the first 
stage, if a sensors’ data is considered implausible then fault 
handling needs to be initiated and completed.  
The data voting is some algorithm that determines an 
output value from input data. Here also an information path to 
system management must be implemented to ensure that 
problems discovered during the voting process are reported.  
Finally the value generated by the output vote may need 
plausibility checking.  
C. System Configuration 
As we assume the number and type of sensors as well as 
the voting algorithms are determined at system integration 
time, we briefly examine a typical system configuration 
sequence as illustrated in Figure 2.  
The application engineer will write the application and 
generate a run-time version together with application-
orientated naming of I/O. This generated run-time version is 
transferred to the run-time system (controller). The I/O naming 
is passed to an engineering tool so that the system integrator 
can map the application I/O to the physically distributed I/O 
devices. The output generated by the engineering tool is based 
on (typically XML) files which describe the characteristics of 
the controller and the remote devices. Once the physical layout 
has been described the engineering tool generates a controller 
configuration file which is read by the controller at boot-time 
and used by the controller to configure the rest of the system, at 
run-time. 
 
 
Figure 2: Sequence Diagram Application Programming 
and System Integration 
A key philosophical question is whether the application 
programmer knows and controls the voting process or whether 
  
it is part of the system integrators domain. In other words does 
the application programmer code the voting or is he/she simply 
presented with a validated input value or appropriate error 
code.  
In our experience there are two distinct routes to an 
application. One alternative is programmed in a language such 
as C/C++, occasionally in ADA, and run on an operating 
system with some real-time characteristics. An external voting 
framework library must then be linked into the application and 
possibly ported to the operating system. The second alternative 
is to program the application in an IEC 61131 environment. 
Typical IEC 61131 environments also come with engineering 
tools and fitted libraries of pre-defined function-blocks, from 
simple logic to PID controllers, which can also be supplied in 
the form of a safety-certified or non-certified function-block. 
These pre-defined blocks can be triggered by similar function-
blocks originating from the application programmer and the 
interfaces to these function-blocks are defined and generally 
abstracted for the programmer.   
We surmise an essential requirement is the ability to 
instantiate a clean and reliable interface between the voting 
framework and the application. As we target (RTE) distributed 
systems the application must interface with the communication 
stack. For this reason we infer that the application-
communication profile interface is a suitable interface and a 
voting framework can be seamlessly embedded into the 
communication profile. The interface would be in the domain 
of the communication protocol with the application as a client 
thereof. To better illustrate this idea we shall briefly explain 
communication technology in the next section. 
D. Communication Techniques 
In distributed automation technologies communication 
stacks are generally structured along the lines of the well-
known OSI recommendation. The OSI recommendation 
stipulates layered architecture but also implies that 
communication conforms to the Dual-Ported RAM (DPR) 
model. One node writes raw-data into one side of a (local) 
DPR, the stack collects this data, formats it and transmits it. 
The stack of the remote device receives this transmission, 
extracts the raw data and presents it to a local DPR for reading 
by the application of the remote device.     
The software interface to this conceptual DPR is the 
application layer which, abstracted to an object diagram, is 
shown in Figure 3. In the mid-section there are 
device/controller profiles and manufacturer specific profiles. 
Device/controller profiles describe the device or the controller - 
the bare minimum information a device must expose to be 
able to partake in structured communication. It will include 
essential device parameters (f.i. baud rate), software and 
hardware versions etc. The device will generally facilitate the 
idea of a manufacturer profile, a profile that is only visible to 
the manufacturer and used to make visible enhanced 
capabilities of the device available only to the manufacturer  
Additionally the device will generally support an 
application profile, a profile that is specific to an application 
domain, for instance motion control, train-doors or lift control. 
All these profiles support some primitive object technology – 
the instantiation and read/write of grouping of associated 
parameters. 
If the controller wants to modify an application-specific 
setting on the device it writes to the object on the controller 
version of the device application profile, the communication 
protocol transfers this value to the device’s application profile. 
The device application may be notified of this modification by 
a suitable call-back or by polling and should react in an 
appropriate fashion to the new data.   
Real time data transfers occur at specific positions in 
specific frames scheduled into the network bandwidth. There is 
generally a mapping configuration that describes the position 
of the application-layer objects in the real-time (Ethernet) 
frame.  
We propose embedding the voting framework within the 
communication stack as a standardised profile. This proposal is 
supported by several important advantages. The 
communication stack already supports tried and tested 
communication and memory mapped interfaces to the 
application. Secondly the safe variants of the communication 
protocols/stacks also support the same systematic so our 
proposal is portable from non-safe to safe environments. 
Thirdly the manipulation of profiles is supported by extant 
engineering tools so there is no need for the development and 
maintenance of third party engineering workflows and 
associated tools.     
 
 
Figure 3: Object Diagram Voting Profile Manager      
III. IMPLEMENTATION DESIGN 
A. Profile Design 
We refer to the fundamental design in Figure 3. At system-
boot, the manufacturer profile instantiates [1..p] 
voteProfiles, each voteProfile representing a set of 
devices whose delivered dataValue will be mapped into a 
list of dataValues voted on and the result of voting written 
into a single outputValue in the scope of the voting profile. 
  
The profile has a number of dataCharacteristics, 
implemented as objects, for instance the maximum number of 
contributing devices, the type (bit-size) of data the devices 
contribute, etc. The profile also contains objects referencing the 
set of methods used for voting on the data. All profile objects 
can be manipulated by standard read/write/modify methods 
supplied by the communication stack.  
 
Some sensors may fail completely during operation and not 
be replaced so inputs to the profile methods are lists of data 
structures and allow for management of operationally unknown 
(but maximum bounded) numbers of redundant sensors. At a 
system-specific temporal offset from the start of the application 
cycle the votingManager method is called which manages 
the entire voting process by calling the voting methods: 
inputData, inputVote, outputVote and 
outputData each corresponding to one of the four stages in 
Figure 1. In essence a method from one voting stage receives 
one list of data structures from the previous and divides it into 
two lists of “good” and “bad” sensors/data, one of which may 
be empty. The “bad” sensor/data lists are forwarded to error 
management. If a sensor behaves badly after a period on the 
“bad” list it may be consigned to an “unusable” list and 
maintenance personnel must take further action, it may equally, 
over time and good behaviour, “rehabilitate” itself and 
contribute to the system.    
B. Prototype  
For a test application three laser distance measuring 
sensors from di-Sorio (LHT 9-45 M 10 P3IU-B4) were each 
connected to a DNP9200 DILNetPC module from SSV 
mounted on a board developed at our institute. The DILNetPC 
is an Atmel AT91RM9200 32-bit ARM9 MCU with 180 MHz 
Clock Speed running Linux 2.26.8. This sensor is polled  
(UDP) by the application at the application cycle time, 20 ms. 
The application runs on a WAGO-I/O-IPC-C6 industrial PC 
(IPC) @ 600MHz using Linux as an operating system (2.6.29 
incl. RT-Preempt) and the Completely Fair Scheduler CFS. 
The implementation language is C and the objects were 
implemented where appropriate as functions or as structures. 
The voting framework was implemented 1:1 to the design as 
explained above. It was tested exhaustively using CUnit 
testing, achieved by passing pre-defined data structures into the 
framework and testing against the expected control flow.  
The framework was then instantiated with appropriate 
algorithms. For the prototype it was decided to use a common 
median voting technique bounded by a 2oo3 methodology. A 
demonstrator is extant.   
I. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
In this paper we have described the conception and 
architecture of a voting framework as well as a prototype 
implementation for distributed systems in terms of a general 
proof-of-concept. We see the results achieved as a prototype 
pattern for the implementation of voting in distributed 
systems.  
Our prototype application featured a cycle time of 20 ms 
and the real-time response of the voting system has not yet 
been fully determined. Our prototype also used a version of 
the soft-PLC, CoDeSys, running on the controllers, this 
version did not feature a RTE protocol interface and voted 
data was read by a C-function called from inside the soft-PLC 
environment. The limitations of these platforms interfaces to 
RTE protocols have yet to be plumbed.  
Whilst the general mechanics are considered useful for 
implementation on a safe communication protocol these are 
difficult from an engineering point of view so we anticipate 
substantial work before the voting framework can be deployed 
in a functionally safe industry environment.     
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